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The increase in oil prices from 2006 through 2008 and concomitant increase in other 
commodity prices raises several interesting questions for southern agriculture in the US. In 2007, 
Southern US producers witnessed a significant run-up in corn prices. On average the US corn 
prices were $2 and $1.16 higher per bushel than in 2005 and 2006, respectively (USDA, 2009a). 
This created an interesting situation in the Southern US where cotton’s stagnant prices over the 
past ten years have led to increased corn plantings throughout traditional cotton areas of the 
southern US. For example, in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi the planted acres of cotton 
from 2006 to 2007 dropped by 26, 47, and 46 percent respectively (USDA, 2009a). The decrease 
in cotton acres for these states were replaced almost 1 for 1 with corn acres. This ability for 
producers to switch indiscriminately between crops was made possible by the passage of the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR). Thus, allowing producers in the 
Southern US to capitalize on usually high prices driven partially by the increased demand for 
biofuels. In addition to being able to switch crops producers are still receiving farm program 
payments from eligible crops even though they may not be producing them. This dynamic shift 
in land allocations is changing the face of the Southern Agricultural landscape.  
Furthermore, the implementation of the Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS) in 2005 and 
2007, in combination with federal and even some state incentives have further contributed to the 
expansion of the ethanol industry. Traditional agricultural policy, specifically the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR), is also playing a role in ability of producers 
to respond to the increased biofuel demand. The 1996 FAIR Act created a paradigm shift in 
agricultural policy as it took a dramatic step toward a market-oriented policy that creates a 
producer decision environment more conducive to competitive adjustments (Coble et al., 2002). Additionally, the FAIR Act also allows producers to respond in a more flexible way to changes 
in market conditions, thereby dampening the influence of weather shocks and technological 
developments (Lence and Hayes, 2002). Without its passage many producers especially in the 
south would not have been able to respond to the increased demand for ethanol in the manner 
they have over the past few years. 
Within the agricultural sector the emergence of the biofuel industry has created a couple 
of unique situations for agricultural policy and producers in the Southern US. The objective of 
this paper is to first examine how the emergence of the biofuel industries has changed the drivers 
of producer land allocation decisions (e.g. output prices, input prices, and farm policy).  
 
Methodology  
This paper employs a two-step estimation of land allocation decisions for producers. The 
crop allocation model is adapted from Laitinen and Theil (1978). Specifically, this method is 
used to investigate land allocation decisions for corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, sugarcane, sorghum, 
and wheat. Equations 1 and 2 use data collected from a couple of different sources that discussed 
in the next section but there are a number of data transformations used in this analysis. First, to 
allow for the model to be estimated both acreages and prices for the crops have been normalized 
with respect to wheat. Second, differences have been taken for all of the variables included in the 
model except for the dummy variable in the second stage of the model. 
  In the first-stage, revenue shares for each crop is written as,  
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,                                  (1) where g is the share crop acreages in the region, dln(zrt) is difference of crop revenues, dln(qit) is 
difference in crop input costs, dln(yjt) is difference in crop output price, r is crop, t is time, i is 
input, and j is output. Equation 1 is estimated in a system using full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). The expected values of revenue shares for this equation are retained and used 
in the second stage of the estimation. 
  In the second stage, land allocation for each crop is estimated via,   
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where dln(Ar,t) is the difference in acres planted,  t D  is the dummy variable for the change in 
agricultural  policy,  and  dln(Ar,t-1)  is  the  lag  difference  of  acres  planted.  Equation  2  is  also 
estimated in a system using FIML.  
Within each of the six equations estimated it is expected that own revenue share elasticity 
for each crop will be positive and significant, implying that as revenue for a crop increases the 
acreage for that crop will increase. Cross revenue share elasticities are expected to be mixed in 
sign. For example, within the corn equation it is possible that increases in soybean revenue share 
could  have  a  positive  and  significant  influence  on  corn  acreage.  Corn  and  soybeans  are  a 
traditional rotation and it is plausible that as one increases the other will follow.  
Furthermore, it is expected that the dummy variable for the 1996 FAIR Act will have 
mixed signs. For some crops the increased flexibility of the policy will be beneficial for acreages 
but for others it has allowed significant decreases in acreages. Specifically, it is expect that for 
the corn acreage equation it will be positive as FAIR Act allowed producers to capitalize on 
higher than average corn prices while still receiving government payments for cotton or crops for which the operation has base acres. Conversely, for cotton it is expected this coefficient will be 
negative as it has allowed producers to switch out of cotton into another.  For sugarcane it is 
expected that the 1996 FAIR Act will have no impact because according to the sugar program 
producers do not receive program payments as they do for all the other crops.   
For the variable lag of crop acreages, it is expected to be positive. The intuition for this 
variable is that even though the 1996 FAIR Act allowed producers to respond quicker to changes 
in market signals, crop acreages are still sticky. Vasavada and Chambers (1986), find that asset 
fixity is a possible reason for producers are sluggish in responding to market signals.  This is 
especially true for cotton and sugarcane were specialized equipment is required for different 
phases of production for these crops. Therefore, it is difficult for producers to switch between 
crops because they must purchase, rent, or lease equipment which may not even currently be 
available in their area. Additionally, if acreages are sticky and asset fixity is present then it is 
expected that the coefficient on lag acres will be close to one.  
Data 
  Table 1 shows the summary statistics and sources for the raw data used in this study. The 
two data sources used for this study are both United States Department of Agricultural datasets. 
First, acreages and prices were collected from “Quick Stats” for 1966 to 2007 for Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. In this region, soybeans and cotton acreages make up the 
largest percentages of the cropland. Corn acreages in the region have been increasing and in 
2007 reach over four million acres as ethanol production continues to grow. Sugarcane acreages 
account for the smallest portion because it is only grown in Louisiana and Texas. Additionally, 
sugarcane acreages exhibit the lowest amount of variability of any crop in the region because it 
has few competitors for acreages. Prices were also collected from the same source. Sugarcane again had the smallest variability in price because of the current sugar program that includes a 
quota system and forfeiture price.  
The last six variables are indices of prices collected from “Agricultural Prices”. The base 
year for these indices is 2000. These indices represent United States prices because there is no 
dataset for this region for the timeframe analyzed in this study. Furthermore, these indices could 
not be broken out to represent seed costs for individual types of seed or fertilizer so they reflect 
seed, fertilizer, wages, fuel, chemical, and repair costs for each industry as a whole.   
Results 
The results for the acreage allocation equations in general follow the expected results. All 
of the results for crop acreages and prices for these models should be interpreted relative to 
wheat because they are normalized with respect to wheat. Table 2 contains the fit statistics for 
each equation in stage two of the model
1. The land allocation equation that had the highest 
adjusted R
2 is sugarcane at 84 percent and the cotton had the lowest at 17 percent. All of the 
other equations have an adjusted R
2 over 49 percent.   
Table 3 contains the results for the land allocation model and they are broken down in the 
table by crop. The allocation of cropland for corn is significantly impacted by revenue share of 
soybeans and sorghum in the region and the lag of corn acres. Unexpectedly, an increase in the 
revenue share of soybeans increases the land allocation of cropland to corn. A possible 
explanation for this is that soybeans and corn work well in a rotation so as soybean acres 
increase, so do corn acres. As expected increases in the revenue share for sorghum decreases 
land allocation to corn by -0.5 percent for every one percent increase sorghum. Lastly, as 
expected the lag of corn acres is positive and highly significant. In this framework the positive 
                                                           
1 Stage 1 of the model estimates is available upon request. significance of this variable also eludes to an asset fixity issue in agriculture. The issue has been 
studied before in American agriculture as Vasavada and Chambers (1986) find that producers are 
sluggish to react to input and output price changes. For corn this coefficient 1.07 implies that 
corn acreages have been increasing from one period to the next which is the current situation 
being observed.   
Cotton land allocation is being driven by revenue share of corn and sorghum. As the 
region has observed with the development of the biofuel industry cotton acres have been losing 
out to corn. According to this estimation a one percent increase in corn revenue share decreases 
cotton land allocation by -0.24 percent. An unexpected result for this equation is that increases in 
sorghum revenue shares increases the cropland allocated to cotton by 0.21 percent. A possible 
explanation for this is that sorghum is a substitute for corn so when sorghum acres are rising then 
corn acres are decreasing as shown in the corn equation above. Furthermore, as expected the 
previous periods cotton planting play a significant role in the current periods cropland allocation 
for cotton. This coefficient is one implying that cotton acres remain almost constant from one 
period to the next. This is indicative of the highly specialized equipment used to harvest cotton 
and the difficulty producers have in switching in out of cotton quickly. However, in recent years 
it appears this switching has accelerated with commodity prices above average, especially for 
corn.   
Crop allocation for rice land is driven by the lag of rice acres. The coefficient for lag rice 
acres is 0.99 implying that rice acres from one year to the next are almost constant. It was 
unexpected that this would be the only significant variable but there are several possible 
explanations. First, rice land preparation requires time and specialized equipment and once 
producers have invested this time it is difficult to get them to switch crops. Secondly, especially in Louisiana rice producers will use the rice fields for the production of crawfish to generate a 
second source of income using the same land. This could be adding to the fixity of rice acres.   
Unexpectedly the only significant driver of cropland allocation for soybeans is the 
previous year’s soybean plantings. For soybeans the coefficient is 0.99 so acres are almost 
constant from one period to the next. Furthermore, soybean acres and corn acres have a strong 
positive correlation and both have been rising in this region as corn acres continue to expand to 
meet biofuel demands.  
For sugar as expected the only driver of land allocation is the lag of sugarcane acreages. 
This crop requires highly specialized equipment for ground preparation, planting, and harvesting. 
Furthermore, this crop is perennial unlike any of the others included in this study making it 
difficult for producers to switch between crops. Another factor increasing the fixity of sugarcane 
acres is the lack of competition for land from other crops because yields for these crops in this 
region are at or below breakeven levels.  
Cropland allocation for sorghum is driven by the rice, soybean and sorghum revenue 
shares. It is positively influenced by rice and soybean revenue shares by 0.002 and 0.11 percent, 
respectively. However, rice and soybean acres are quasi-fixed because of rice’s land preparation 
equipment needed and soybean acres are positively correlated with corn acres. But, in recent 
years corn acres have been increasing and so have sorghum acres. Sorghum acres are negatively 
influenced by own revenue shares relative to wheat. Therefore, as sorghum revenue shares 
increase the land allocated to sorghum decreases by -0.26. This is unexpected and counter 
intuitive to what was expected. A possible reason for this is that corn and sorghum are highly 
substitutable so lower sorghum prices increase the demand for sorghum by the livestock industry. Lastly, sorghum land allocation is driven by the previous period’s sorghum plantings. 
Asset fixity also is present in sorghum where relative to wheat the current periods planting are 
0.97 of the previous year’s plantings.   
Conclusions 
  In recent years, the crop mixes in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have 
changed significantly as producers attempt to maximize profits and capitalize on above average 
commodity prices. Of particular interest in this study are the factors driving cropland allocation 
decisions for corn and cotton. Corn acreage in the region has been growing, primarily at the 
expense of cotton acreage. A couple of the key drivers thought to be behind this growth in corn 
acres are the passage of the 1996 FAIR Act, allowing producers flexibility in crop selection, and 
government mandates on biofuel production. In general the results from this study show that 
1996 FAIR Act has not played a significant role in cropland allocations for any of the crops as 
was expected and intended for the bill to accomplish. Instead this study shows that irrespective 
of the 1996 FAIR Act there is asset fixity within cropland acreages as Vasavada and Chambers 
(1986) pointed out. However, in 2008 and 2009 significantly more cropland in this region has 
been shifting into corn acres and acreage fixity could be decrease. Therefore, the next step in this 
study is to continue our examination of this issue of acreage fixity since the 1996 FAIR Act and 
the influence of biofuels on acreages. 
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Units Mean Stdev Max Min Source
Corn Acres 1,000 Ac 2205 836 4430 927 USDA, 2009a
Cotton Acres 1,000 Ac 8319 1142 10270 5427 USDA, 2009a
Rice Acres 1,000 Ac 2255 400 3150 1486 USDA, 2009a
Sorghum Acres 1,000 Ac 5088 1930 8409 2168 USDA, 2009a
Soybean Acres 1,000 Ac 8339 2301 13660 4960 USDA, 2009a
Sugar Acres 1,000 Ac 321 77 465 201 USDA, 2009a
Corn Price $/bu 2.44 $              0.64 $              3.91 $              1.21 $              USDA, 2009a
Cotton Price $/lb 0.51 $              0.14 $              0.75 $              0.22 $              USDA, 2009a
Rice Price $/cwt 7.92 $              2.44 $              15.19 $            3.96 $              USDA, 2009a
Sorghum Price $/cwt 3.81 $              1.05 $              6.42 $              1.73 $              USDA, 2009a
Soybean Price $/bu 5.58 $              1.49 $              9.05 $              2.34 $              USDA, 2009a
Sugar Price ct/lb 22.83 $            7.93 $              52.00 $            8.86 $              USDA, 2009a
Seed Index 74.7 36.4 164.8 19.5 USDA, 2009b
Fertilizer Index 88.7 35.5 195.5 33.2 USDA, 2009b
Chemical Index 73.0 24.1 108.1 36.2 USDA, 2009b
Fuel Index 83.1 41.9 197.3 24.3 USDA, 2009b
Wages Index 63.7 33.0 126.4 15.6 USDA, 2009b
Repair Index 73.1 26.7 120.3 30.8 USDA, 2009bTable 2: Land Allocation Model Fit Statistics 









Corn Acres  8  33  0.007  0.00022  0.015  0.785  0.740 
Cotton Acres  8  33  0.039  0.00119  0.035  0.317  0.173 
Rice Acres  8  33  0.003  0.00008  0.009  0.580  0.491 
Soybean Acres  8  33  0.013  0.00039  0.020  0.843  0.810 
Sugar Acres  8  33  0.000  0.00000  0.001  0.865  0.836 
Sorghum Acres  8  33  0.016  0.00049  0.022  0.861  0.832 
 Table 3: Results for Acreage Allocation 
Variable  Description  Estimate  Std Error 
Corn Acres 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  0.020  0.043 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  -0.006  0.006 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.000  0.000 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  0.033*  0.018 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  -0.028  0.086 
sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  -0.051  0.022 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  -0.033  0.054 
lagcornac  ln diff. lag of corn acres  1.075***  0.044 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  -0.249*  0.141 
Cotton Acres 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  0.008  0.033 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.000  0.002 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  -0.060  0.080 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  0.492  0.666 
sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  0.214*  0.124 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  -0.011  0.040 
lagcottonac  ln diff. lag of cotton acres  1.005***  0.024 
Rice Acres 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  -0.012  0.039 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  -0.009  0.009 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.000  0.001 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  0.016  0.022 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  0.036  0.186 
sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  0.012  0.035 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  0.001  0.039 
lagriceac  ln diff. lag of rice acres  0.995***  0.024 
Soybean Acres 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  -0.075  0.086 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  0.014  0.021 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.000  0.001 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  -0.032  0.050 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  -0.483  0.419 
sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  0.050  0.078 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  -0.006  0.030 
lagsoybean  ln diff. lag of soybean acres  0.988***  0.013 
Sugarcane Acres 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  -0.003  0.005 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  0.001  0.001 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.000  0.000 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  -0.003  0.003 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  0.008  0.026 sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  0.002  0.005 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  0.030  0.035 
lagsugarac  ln diff. lag of sugar acres  0.992***  0.025 
Sorghum Acres 
cornrevsh  ln diff. corn share of revenue  0.136  0.095 
cottonrevsh  ln diff. cotton share of revenue  0.012  0.023 
ricerevsh  ln diff. rice share of revenue  0.002*  0.001 
soybeanrevsh  ln diff. soybean share of revenue  0.114**  0.055 
sugarrevsh  ln diff. sugarcane share of revenue  0.220  0.466 
sorghumrevsh  ln diff. sorghum share of revenue  -0.265***  0.087 
farmbill96  dummy 1996 Farm Bill  -0.017  0.058 
lagsorghumac  ln diff. lag of sorghum acres  0.975***  0.021 
* significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level, significant at 1%level  
       